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§1. Retaining content through context change 
 
1.1 Cognitive dynamics 
 
If someone wants to say the same today as he expressed yesterday using 
the word 'today', he must replace this word with 'yesterday'. Although 
the thought is the same its verbal expression must be different so that the 
sense, which would otherwise be affected by the differing times of 
utterance, is readjusted. [Frege, The Thought] 
 
In this well-known passage Frege draws a consequence from the context-
sensitivity of natural language sentences. Since the same sentence, with the 
same linguistic meaning, can express different propositions in different 
contexts, we may have to use a different sentence with a different linguistic 
meaning if we want to express the same proposition in a changed context. 
 As Perry and Kaplan emphasized, the language of thought behaves 
similarly: in order to think the same thing today which I thought yesterday 
using the mental word 'today', I must replace this word with 'yesterday'. 
This raises the problem of cognitive dynamics. In order to retain an attitude 
(e.g. belief) toward a certain content one may have to change the sentence 
through which that content is apprehended. It follows that retaining a belief 
cannot be equated with keeping the same sentence in one's belief box. Yet 
retaining the belief is not merely a matter of accepting, at t', a sentence s' 
expressing the same content which was expressed by the sentence s 
accepted at t; for one may fail to realize that s and s' express the same 
content. Kaplan gives the following example: 
 
I first think "His pants are on fire". I later realize "I am he" and thus 
come to think "My pants are on fire." Still later, I decide that I was 
wrong in thinking "I am he" and conclude "His pants were on fire". If, in 
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fact, I am he, have I retained my belief that my pants are on fire simply 
because I believe the same content, though under a different character? 
[Kaplan 1989: 537n.] 
 
The obvious answer to this rhetorical question is 'No'. To retain a belief it 
is not sufficient to accept a sentence s' expressing the same content as the 
previously accepted sentence. There must be some special relation between 
the new sentence and the old one — a special relation which it is the 
business of the theory of cognitive dynamics to investigate. 
 What I want to do in this paper is less to further the study of 
cognitive dynamics than to broaden its scope. I want to consider a new 
dimension of contextual change, and the specific form of retention of 
content that goes along with it. 
 
1.2 Horizontal and vertical interpreting 
To 'retain' the content of a speech or thought episode even though the 
context changes, we must find a sentence expressing the same content in 
the new context. This can be done in two ways. In Frege's example, 'today' 
is replaced by 'yesterday'; but it could also be replaced by an explicit date 
(e.g 'Wednesday' or 'the tenth of March'). Using the second method we 
make the sentence less context-dependent in order to free it from the 
contingencies of the original context. Using the first method we keep the 
degree of context-sensitivity constant but we compensate for the change in 
context by a complementary linguistic change: we 'adjust' indexicals. 
 The second method (substituting names or dates for indexicals) 
corresponds to Perry's notion of 'interpreting up' while the first method 
(shifting indexicals) corresponds to his 'lateral interpreting': 
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To interpret a sentence heard or read or otherwise apprehended is to find 
a sentence with the same interpretation in one's own situation, as the 
apprehended sentence had in the utterance of origin. 
 We can distinguish several kinds of interpreting. 
 
   Interpreting up. This is to find an interpreting sentence with a less 
sensitive meaning. My friend in San Francisco sends me a card on which 
he has written, 'This city has dilapidated cable cars.' I write in the draft 
of my travel-guide: 'San Francisco has dilapidated cable cars.' Note that 
the sentence I find is not insensitive. It has a tense and a proper name. 
But it is less sensitive than the sentence I read on the card; it has a 
constant or near-constant interpretation over a wider range of change in 
the context. 
   Interpreting down. This is to find a more sensitive sentence with the 
same interpretation. On a trip to San Francisco I read in my Mobil-
Guide, 'San Francisco has dilapidated cable cars'. I write on my note-
pad, 'This city has dilapidated cable cars.' Or I think it. But I do not get 
on the cable cars I see. 
   Lateral interpreting. This is to find a sensitive sentence to interpret a 
sensitive sentence. My friend shouts, 'You are about to be hit by a rock.' 
I think, 'I am about to be hit by a rock'. [Perry 1986a: 352] 
 
Let us simplify the terminology and talk of 'vertical interpreting' when 
what is affected is the degree of context-sensitivity of the accepted 
sentence. Interpreting up and down are two instances of vertical 
interpreting. In contrast, lateral (or horizontal) interpreting is the sort of 
thing Frege talks about: we go from 'You are about to be hit' to 'I am about 
to be hit' or from 'It's a lovely day today' to 'It was a lovely day yesterday'. 
 
1.3 Vertical interpreting and contextual change 
Horizontal interpreting essentially involves a change of context. It is 
because the context changes that we have to adjust the expression in order 
to maintain the content fixed. The linguistic change compensates for that 
contextual change, and is justified only insofar as the latter occurs. I will 
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say that a linguistic change is of the 'compensatory' variety whenever the 
following conditions are satisfied: 
 
(i) Had the accepted sentence been left unchanged, the change of context 
would have caused a change in the expressed content. 
 
(ii) Had the context been left unchanged, the change in the accepted 
sentence would have caused a change in the expressed content. 
 
It is easy to check that the two conditions are satisfied in Frege's example. 
The original sentence 'Today is F' was appropriate to the context in which 
it was tokened (viz. Wednesday); but in a different context (viz. the next 
day) the same sentence would express a different content. To maintain the 
content fixed, the sentence has to be changed. Condition (i), therefore, is 
satisfied. The second condition also is satisfied: the changed sentence 
'Yesterday was F' is appropriate to the new context (one day later); but if it 
had been tokened in the original context (Wednesday) the expressed 
content would have been different. 
 With vertical interpreting, the situation is rather different, or so it 
seems. Traditionally, vertical interpreting is not considered as involving a 
change of context at all, but merely a change of wording. What follows is a 
prima facie argument in behalf of the traditional picture. 
 
In a given context, a given content can be expressed in two manners: 
either in a context-sensitive manner or in a context-insensitive manner. 
Vertical interpreting is merely the transition from one manner of 
expression to the other. Thus I can think 'Today is F', realize that today 
is Wednesday, and infer 'Wednesday is F'. The context remains what it 
was: the day of utterance is unchanged, in contrast to what happens in 
Frege's example (the shift from 'today' to 'yesterday'). This shows that 
vertical interpreting can take place in the absence of contextual change 
— in such a way that the first condition above does not apply. 
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 Vertical interpreting can also take place as a result of context change, 
as I pointed out earlier: to express on Thursday the same content that 
was expressed by 'today is F' on Wednesday, I may opt for the vertical 
method and refer to the previous day as 'Wednesday'. Even in that case, 
however, the linguistic change is not compensatory; for the second 
condition stated above is not satisfied. Had the context been left 
unchanged, the change in the accepted sentence would not have caused a 
change in the expressed content. For 'interpreting up' is a linguistic 
change which maintains content fixed whether or not a change of 
context occurs. 
 
This argument supports the claim that, in contrast to horizontal 
interpreting, vertical interpreting is de-coupled from contextual change. 
Yet I believe that it is not: vertical interpreting, in the framework I will set 
up, does involve a change of context.1 This conclusion is welcome, for it 
facilitates theoretical unification. Vertical interpreting has many 
characteristics in common with horizontal interpreting, and it poses much 
the same problems. In particular it raises the problem of cognitive 
dynamics. Thus we have no trouble constructing a counterpart to Kaplan's 
example involving vertical rather than horizontal interpreting: 
 
I first think 'Today is F'. I later realize 'Today is Wednesday' and thus 
come to think 'Wednesday is F.' Still later, I decide that I was wrong in 
thinking 'Today is Wednesday' and conclude 'Today is F'. If, in fact, 
today is Wednesday, have I retained my belief that Wednesday is F 
simply because I believe the same content, though under a different 
character? 
 
1.4 Basic vertical interpreting 
                                           
1 Evidence for that claim will be offered only with respect to basic vertical interpreting 
— the specific topic of this paper. 
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There are two forms of vertical interpreting, illustrated by the following 
pieces of reasoning: 
 
(1) 
This city has dilapidated cable cars 
This city = San Francisco 
Ergo: San Francisco has dilapidated cable cars 
 
(2) 
It's raining 
This is Paris 
Ergo: it's raining in Paris 
 
(1) is Perry's example of 'interpreting up'. (2) is a different type of example, 
which I will focus on in this paper. It illustrates what I call 'basic vertical 
interpreting'. 
 In both cases, we start with a context-sensitive sentence: 'It's raining', 
or 'This city has dilapidated cable cars'. The sentence is context-sensitive 
because a constituent of the proposition which it expresses is determined 
by the context. 'This city has dilapidated cable cars', uttered in San 
Francisco (in the circumstances imagined by Perry), is true if and only if 
San Francisco has dilapidated cable cars. San Francisco is a constituent of 
content determined by the context. In the same way, when, at place p, I 
look out the window and say 'It's raining', what I say is true if and only if 
it's raining at p. In both (1) and (2), the contextual component of content 
comes to be objectively designated in the conclusion. 
 The difference between (1) and (2) lies in the manner in which the 
content of the original sentence depends on the context. In (1), before 
getting to be objectively designated (in the conclusion), the contextual 
component of content is already 'articulated', by means of the indexical 
phrase 'this city'. That phrase stands for San Francisco. It does so by virtue 
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of two factors: (i) a linguistic factor — the meaning of the phrase 'this city'; 
and (ii) a contextual factor — the city which the speaker manifests the 
intention to demonstrate. But in (2), the context-dependent constituent of 
content is not articulated at all. It is determined by the contextual factor 
alone. 
 The notion of an unarticulated constituent is presented in this 
passage from Perry: 
 
It is a rainy Saturday morning in Palo Alto. I have plans for tennis. But 
my younger son looks out the window and says, 'It is raining.' I go back 
to sleep. 
 What my son said was true, because it was raining in Palo Alto. 
There were all sorts of places where it wasn't raining: it doesn't just rain 
or not, it rains in some places while not raining in others. In order to 
assign a truth-value to my son's statement, as I just did, I needed a place. 
But no component of his statement stood for a place. The verb 'raining' 
supplied the relation rains (t, p) — a dyadic relation between times and 
places, as we have just noted. The tensed auxiliary 'is' supplies a time, 
the time at which the statement was made. 'It' doesn't supply anything, 
but is just syntactic filler. So Palo Alto is a constituent of the content of 
my son's remark, which no component of his statement designate; it is an 
unarticulated constituent. [Perry 1986b: 206] 
 
Perry claims, correctly, that there is a difference between 'It's raining' and 
'It's raining here'. The content is the same: both utterances are true if and 
only if it's raining in Palo Alto. In both cases, Palo Alto is a contextual 
constituent of content. But that constituent is determined purely 
contextually in one case, partly contextually in the other case.2 
                                           
2  Arguably, there is a continuum between pure indexicality and unarticulated 
constituency. Demonstratives fall in between. The meaning of a demonstrative can be 
very poor (as in 'he' or 'that man'); at least it does not determine the referent, which 
depends upon the intentions manifested by the speaker. That is quite different from 'I', 
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 In the same paper (p. 218), Perry makes a further claim: that 'It's 
raining here' is intermediate between 'It's raining' and 'It's raining in Paris'. 
To go from 'It's raining' to 'It's raining in Paris', we must first convert 'It's 
raining' into the indexical thought 'It's raining here'. Entertaining the 
indexical thought 'It's raining here' (in contrast to the pure contextual 
thought 'It's raining') already involves reflecting on the relevant aspect of 
the context (the place where we are) and making it explicit in the 
representation itself. If Perry is right the transition represented in (2) 
comprises four steps rather than three: 
 
(a)  It's raining 
(b) It's raining here 
(c)  here = Paris 
(d) Ergo: It's raining in Paris 
 
In (a) the place is a purely contextual constituent of content. In (b) that 
constituent is reflected on and thought about in an egocentric manner. Then 
the 'bridging thought' (c) occurs, and the egocentric file is linked to an 
encyclopedic one. The conclusion (d) is an encyclopedic thought.3 
 The step from from (b) to (d) is an instance of the transition 
represented in (1). The transition represented in (2) therefore is more 
complex than and contains the transition illustrated by (1). But it contains 
something else as well: a more basic transition from unarticulatedness to 
articulatedness (i.e., the transition from (a) to (b)). 
                                                                                                                           
where there is a rule whose application does not have to be licensed by the speaker's 
intentions. That is also different from unarticulated constituency cases, where 
communicative intentions do all the job. 
3 I am using the terminology of Recanati 1993. 
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 The claim that indexicality mediates between unarticulated 
constituency and objective designation is not specifically Perry's; it has 
been made by various authors such as e.g. Sechehaye (1926) or Lyons 
(1975). Whether or not they are right, I think we cannot but acknowledge 
that the transition in (2) involves a basic step which (1) does not involve: 
the step from unarticulatedness to articulatedness. Transitions involving 
that basic step (or its converse: the step from articulatedness to 
unarticulatedness) are instances of what I call 'basic vertical interpreting' — 
the process which I am going to study in this paper. 
 
§2. Austinian semantics 
 
2.1 Austinian propositions 
The theoretical framework I will assume is that of 'Austinian semantics' 
(Barwise and Etchemendy 1987; Recanati forthcoming a). In Austinian 
semantics, a sentential representation represents a state of affairs, but its 
content cannot be reduced to the state of affairs it represents. To use a 
representation, in speech or in thought, is to 'apply' it to some situation. 
The complete content of a speech episode or a thought episode in which a 
representation r is used therefore involves not only the state of affairs  
which r represents, but also the situation s which the representation is 
supposed to fit. The complete content of the representational act is an 
'Austinian proposition', consisting of a situation and a fact presented as 
holding in that situation. An Austinian proposition is a proposition of the 
form: 
 
s |=  
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 That the complete content of an utterance or thought is an Austinian 
proposition is illustrated the following example, due to Barwise and 
Etchemendy (Barwise and Etchemendy 1987:121-2). Looking at a poker 
game, I say 'Claire has a good hand'. I describe the situation I am 
witnessing as a situation in which Claire has a good hand. If I am mistaken 
and Claire is not a constituent of the situation (if she is not among the 
players of the game I am watching, contrary to what I believe), my 
utterance is not true — even if Claire is playing poker in some other part of 
the city and has a good hand there; the utterance is not true because the 
relevant situation is not as described. In other words, rather than being true 
iff Claire has a good hand, the utterance is true iff the situation concerned 
by the utterance supports <<Claire has a good hand>>. The complete 
content of the utterance therefore is: 
 
 that poker game |= <<Claire has a good hand>> 
 
2.2 Situations and  facts 
In situation theory (e.g. Barwise 1989), situations are modeled as sets of 
atomic facts. An atomic fact (or state of affairs — I will use the two 
phrases indifferently) is a triple <<Rn, <a1, ..., an>, i>> consisting of an n-
place relation, a sequence of n appropriate arguments, and a polarity i 
which can be 0 or 1. Thus the fact that Claire has a good hand can be 
represented as: 
 
<<Has-a-good-hand, <Claire>, 1>> 
 
 Atomic facts (whether positive or negative) are the only facts which 
situations contain. What about non-atomic facts, e.g. disjunctive facts 
(John loves Mary or Peter hates Paul), general facts (There is a man who 
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loves Mary), and so forth? A situation s cannot contain such facts, but it 
can support them, by virtue of the atomic facts it contains. The 'support' 
relation can be defined along the following lines: 
 
• A situation s supports an atomic fact  (in symbols: s |= ) just in case 
 s. 
• A situation s supports a disjunctive fact   ' just in case s |=  or s |= '. 
• A situation s supports an existential fact x (x) iff, for some object a, s 
supports (a). 
• ... 
 
The set of all situations which support a fact  (whether  is atomic or not) 
defines the situation type T. To say that a situation is of the type Tis to 
say that it belongs to {s | s |= }. Insofar as it states a fact , a sentential 
representation (be it linguistic or mental) denotes a certain situation type, 
namely T. According to Austinian semantics, the representation is true if 
and only if the situation which it concerns belongs to the situation type 
which it denotes (Austin 1950). 
 
2.3 The contextual nature of situations 
A crucial feature of the theory I will develop within the Austinian 
framework is the contextual nature of the situational component. The 
situation which a representation concerns is a highly context-dependent 
aspect of its content; like the reference of a demonstrative, it depends upon 
the intentions manifested by the speaker. The situational component is even 
more heavily dependent on context than the reference of a demonstrative. 
In the theory I will develop, the situational content is unarticulated: it is a 
purely contextual component of content.  
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 Note how strong the claim I am making is. If the content of every 
utterance contains a situational component which is purely contextual, then 
context-dependence is generalized in a very radical manner. The theory to 
be developed is indeed radically 'contextualist'.4 But I will not elaborate 
that point in this paper. 
 The claim that the situation talked about is (always) a purely 
contextual aspect of content can be objected to, on the grounds that the 
situation can be made explicit in the sentence itself. Consider the following 
pair: 
 
It is raining 
 
In Paris, it is raining 
 
Assume that the first sentence is uttered in Paris and concerns Paris. The 
objection goes as follows: Both representations are about Paris. In the 
second case, however, the situation the representation is about (Paris) is 
linguistically encoded; it is not a purely pragmatic, contextual component. 
Hence the situational component is not always contextual. 
 But I will deny that the two representations concern one and the 
same situation. As we will see, as soon as the situation (Paris) is made 
explicit in the representation itself, another situation replaces it in the 
content of the new thought thus generated. It follows that basic vertical 
interpreting entails a change of context. This is reminiscent of Gardiner's 
treatment of illocutionary force (which he calls 'sentence-quality'). 
Sentence-quality is elusive, Gardiner says. As soon as it is made explicit by 
means of such phrases as 'I assure you', "with them comes a new 
                                           
4 'Contextualism' is my name for the sort of position argued for by Travis (passim) and 
Searle (1978, 1980). 
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importation of sentence-quality, the nature of which is not declared. Thus 
the attempt to assert the quality of a sentence within that sentence itself 
does but involve us in an infinite regress" (Gardiner 1932: 1991).5 Austin 
rejected that line of argument and claimed that illocutionary force can be 
made explicit reflexively in the utterance itself (Austin 1962). Be that as it 
may, the situational component of content arguably has the same elusive 
property which Gardiner ascribes to illocutionary force: it is not possible to 
encode the situational component without shifting it. 
 
§3. -structures 
 
3.1 Introducing the notion 
-structures are sentence-like representations which contain other sentence-
like representations. To simplify matters, I will talk of 'sentences' instead of 
'sentence-like representations'. -structures therefore are complex sentences 
consisting of a sentence (the 'radical') and an expression (the '-part') which 
makes a sentence out of a sentence. Examples of such complex sentences 
include: 
 
In Spain / cigarettes are cheap 
 
In John's mind / cigarettes are cheap 
 
When I was young, it was the case that / cigarettes are cheap 
 
                                           
5 On Gardiner, Austin and the explicit marking of illocutionary force, see Recanati 
1987: 31ff. 
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 In typical -structures (the only -structures I will consider in this 
paper) the -part indicates the situation in which the radical holds.6 A 
sentence may be true of (or at) a situation, but nor of/at another. With 
respect to the situation in Spain, it is true that cigarettes are cheap; but that 
is not true in other situations (e.g. in France). In the first example above, it 
is the job of the expression 'In Spain' to indicate the specific situation in 
which the radical 'cigarettes are cheap' is said to hold. The -parts 'in John's 
mind' and 'when I was young' play the same role in the other examples, 
except that the situations referred to are rather different. 
 
3.2 Factual and counterfactual -structures 
In factual -structures, the -part indicates that the radical holds in a 
(possibly maximal) portion of the actual world, or in a set of such portions 
(situation type). The portions of @ referred to in factual -structures can be 
variously circumscribed. In some cases — as in the third example above — 
the situation is temporally circumscribed. Temporal -structures include: 
 
(At t/ when John gets back) it will be the case that p 
 
(At t/ when John got back) it was the case that p 
 
It sometimes happens that p 
 
The situation talked about can also be spatially circumscribed: 
 
                                           
6 The negation operator 'it is not the case that' is an exception (hence negative sentences 
are 'atypical' -structures): it makes a sentence out of a sentence, but it does not indicate 
the situation in which the radical holds. For more about typical and atypical -
structures, see Recanati forthcoming b, part 3, where an expanded version of this 
material is presented. 
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Two miles from here, it is the case that p 
 
Where John lives, it is the case that p 
 
In Chicago, p 
 
Other portions of @ are circumscribed around individuals. (An individual 
like John, or an event like World War II, can both be considered as 
'situations' in the technical sense, i.e. as a sets of atomic facts.) There are, I 
believe, still other methods of individuating portions of @, but I cannot go 
into this matter and I will be content with the examples I have given. I turn 
to counterfactual -structures. 
 The defining characteristic of counterfactual -structures is that they 
talk about counterfactual situations or situation types. Here I am not using 
'counterfactual situation' in the sense of a situation which does not obtain in 
the actual world. By counterfactual situation I mean a (possibly maximal) 
portion of an alternative to the actual world @. Factual situations are 
portions of @; counterfactual situations are portions of alternatives to @ — 
imaginary worlds, etc. A counterfactual situation type is a set of situations 
which contains at least some counterfactual situation. 
 Two types of counterfactual -structures are worth distinguishing: 
 
• Meta-representational -structures present the radical as holding in the 
situation described by some representation which the -part refers to. 
Mental states, pictures, stories, utterances, etc. all count as 'representations' 
in the relevant sense. Examples of meta-representational -structures 
include: 
 
In John's mind, p 
 
In the picture, p 
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John believes that p 
 
John said that p 
 
According to the Ancients, p 
 
At the end of Gone with the wind, p 
 
• In hypothetical -structures, the situation (or type of situation) referred to 
is counterfactual, but it is not presented as the situation depicted by some 
representation. Examples of hypothetical -structures include: 
 
It might have been the case that p 
 
It may be the case that p 
 
If John had come, it would have been the case that p 
 
If John has come, then it is the case that p 
 
Necessarily, p 
 
It is likely that p7 
 
                                           
7 Some readers may be surprised by my claim that an indicative conditional is a 
counterfactual -structure. Is there not a distinction between indicative conditionals and 
counterfactual conditionals? But I have defined a counterfactual situation type as one 
that contains some counterfactual situation; and I maintain that an indicative conditional 
talks about such a situation type. Both indicative and counterfactual conditionals thus 
talk about counterfactual situation types. The difference is that in a counterfactual 
conditional, the situation type contains only counterfactual situations, while there is no 
such restriction in the case of an indicative conditional. 
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3.3 Iterated and situated -structures 
-structures are complex representations with two constituents: a radical 
and a -part. The radical can be 'simple', or it can itself be a -structure. If 
the radical itself is a -structure, the resulting representation is an iterated 
-structure such as the following: 
 
 The landlord thought that in 1996, Peter would be pennyless 
 
The structure of this representation is p)). A simple sentence, 'Peter is 
pennyless', is turned into a -structure by applying to it the -part 'In 1996 
it will be the case that'. A second -part, viz. 'the landlord thinks', applies to 
the resulting -structure, thus generating an iterated -structure 'the 
landlord thinks that/ in 1996 it will be the case that/ Peter is pennyless'. A 
third -part, viz. the 'past' operator, applies to that iterated -structure. Four 
representations can therefore be discerned within (1): an atomic 
representation, a simple -structure, and two iterated -structures of 
increasing complexity. The most complex iterated -structure, viz. (i), 
corresponds to the proposition expressed by (1): 
 
(i) It was the case that...    p)) 
(ii) the landlord thinks that...      p) 
(iii)  in 1996 it will be the case that...       p 
(iv)     Peter is pennyless         p 
 
 Semantically, each -structure represents some situation (indicated 
by the -part) as supporting a certain fact (expressed by the radical in that 
-structure). Let f be a function from -parts to the situations they indicate; 
and let s1, s2 and s3 be the values of that function for the arguments 'in 1996 
it will be the case that', 'the landlord thinks that' and 'it was the case that' 
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respectively. Finally, let  be the fact expressed by (iv). The simple -
structure iii) expresses the fact that s1 |= ii) expresses the fact that s2 |= 
<<s1 |= >>and (i) — the global -structure — expresses the fact that s3 |= 
<<s2 |= << s1 |= >> >>
 What further complicates the picture is the fact that -structures, 
however complex, are representations, and as such they must themselves be 
interpreted with respect to some situation. As we have seen, a 
representation represents a state of affairs, but its content cannot be 
reduced to the state of affairs it represents. The complete (or 'broad') 
content of a representation r involves not only the state of affairs  which r 
represents, but also the situation s  in which the represented fact holds. 
The complete content of the representational act is an 'Austinian 
proposition', of the form: 
 
s |=  
 
 A -structure expresses a fact which has precisely that form; hence 
-structures express Austinian propositions. But, qua representations, -
structures themselves must be interpreted with respect to situations. The 
complete content of the representational act of using a -structure p 
involves not only the Austinian fact which it expresses, but also a situation 
which is presented as supporting that fact. The structure of the complete 
content is: 
 
s ' |= <<s  |=  
 
Here s is the situation represented by the -structure as that in which the 
fact expressed by the radical holds; while s' is the situation with respect to 
which the -structure itself is interpreted. s and s' play quite different roles: 
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I will say that s' is 'exercised' in interpreting the -structure, while s is 
'mentioned' by a constituent of the -structure. To distinguish the two roles, 
I will put the exercised situation into brackets: 
 
[s '] |= << s  |=  
 
This formula corresponds to what I call a situated -structure. 
 Let us return to our complex example of iterated structure: 'The 
landlord thought that in 1996, Peter would be pennyless'. That complex -
structure mentions three situations s1, s2 and s3 corresponding to the three 
-parts, but it is contextually interpreted with respect to yet another 
situation — some situation in which there is one and only one landlord, for 
example the rent situation.8 The result is a situated -structure, with a 
rather complex representational component: 
 
 [The rent situation] |= << s3 |= <<s2 |= << s1 |= >> >> >> 
 
3.4 Exercised situation vs. mentioned situation 
It is easy to confuse the exercised situation and the mentioned situation. 
Both are used to interpret a representation expressed by (a part of) the -
structure: the representation expressed by the radical is interpreted with 
respect to the mentioned situation, and the representation globally 
expressed by the -structure is interpreted with respect to the exercised 
situation. Despite their functional similarity, the situation exercised and 
that mentioned by the -part must be distinguished; for, in general at least, 
they are distinct situations. What follows is an argument in support of the 
                                           
8 It is a constraint on definite descriptions that they must be interpreted with respect to 
situations in which there is one and only one object satisfying their descriptive content. 
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bold conjecture, that the exercised situation and the mentioned situation are 
always distinct. 
 When I say 'In Paris, it is raining', this makes sense only insofar as 
the location Paris is virtually contrasted with some other location, such as 
London or the country. This is a point which European 'structuralism' has 
much insisted on: whatever is singled out in speech is extracted from a 
'paradigm' or contrastive set. If no other location was implicitly considered, 
the specification of the location would play no role and could be omitted. 
The fact that the location is singled out shows that the situation with 
respect to which the locationally specific representation is interpreted 
includes the mentioned location and others from the same paradigm. The 
situation might be, for example, the Continent of Europe (which contains 
Paris, Rome, Vienna, etc.). But the locationally non-specific 'It is raining' 
can be interpreted with respect to a smaller situation, viz. Paris itself (to the 
exclusion of any other location). Thus we have the following contrast: 
 
(1) [Paris] |= << it is raining >> 
(2) [Europe] |= << Paris |= << it is raining >> >> 
 
A locationally specific utterance such as 'In Paris, it is raining' contextually 
expresses a situated -structure like (2). But if someone, in Paris, utters the 
locationally non-specific 'It is raining', the complete content she thereby 
expresses may well be simpler and correspond to (1). 
 From what I have said it follows that basic vertical interpreting 
involves a change of context. In the transition from 'It's raining' to 'It's 
raining in Paris', the exercised situation shifts and becomes 'larger'.9 It also 
                                           
9 Intuitively, we go from a portion of reality (e.g. the city of Paris) to a larger portion 
containing the city of Paris plus other places. But I said that situations are modeled as 
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follows that (contrary to what was suggested earlier) the content changes 
from 'It's raining' to 'It's raining in Paris': as (2) shows, the content of 'It's 
raining in Paris' is more complex than the content of 'It's raining'. Despite 
this change in content, some crucial aspect of the content of the original 
representation is retained. What is retained is the Austinian structure 'Paris 
|= <<It's raining>>', which is common to (1) and to (2). In (2) that structure 
is that of the radical, while in (1) that structure corresponds to the complete 
content.10 
 In the next two sections I will study a transition opposite to that from 
(1) to (2). The latter is an instance of 'reflection': 
 
Reflection 
[s ] |= p --->  [s' ] |= << s |= p >>. 
 
The transition I am going to talk about, 'projection', has the opposite form: 
 
                                                                                                                           
sets of facts, hence the relevant relation 'larger than' must be defined in terms of set 
inclusion. This constraint has one interesting consequence: the facts which situations 
contain must be 'persistent' (otherwise the intuitive relation 'larger than' can no longer 
be captured). However central they are, those issues involving persistence and 
situational inclusion cannot be dealt with in this paper, and I will keep using intuitive 
notions such as that of a situation's being 'larger' than another one and 'containing' it as 
a constituent without analysing them. 
10  Note that 'It's raining here' is closer to 'It's raining in Paris' than to 'It's raining' in 
both respects. (i) The place where it is raining is explicitly represented both in 'It's 
raining in Paris' and in 'It's raining here'. The content of 'It's raining here' is an iterated 
-structure, like the content of 'It's raining in Paris' (and unlike the simpler content of 
'It's raining'). (ii) In both cases that place is virtually contrasted with others, hence the 
exercised situation is larger than that in (1). 
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Projection 
[s' ] |= << s |= p >>  --->  [s ] |= p. 
 
§4. Projection 
 
4.1 Projection as situational assumption 
Given a situated -structure [s '] |= << s  |= , consisting of an exercised 
situation and an inner -structure, projection consists in 'assuming' the 
mentioned situation s which figures in the inner -structure: the exercised 
situation with respect to which the -structure is interpreted drops out of 
the picture, and the mentioned situation becomes the exercised situation. 
Projection therefore takes us from (a) to (b): 
 
(a)  [s '] |= << s  |= 
(b)   [s ] |=  
 
In this section I will give a few examples of projection. We shall see that 
projection can operate from any -structure, and that it can also operate 
from 'simple' representations. 
 
4.2 Projection from hypothetical -structures 
Imagine the following discourse, consisting of four sentences D1 to D4: 
 
(D) 
John may be early. If he is early, he will wait. He will read the 
newspaper, or will think about his next book. There won't be any 
problem. 
 
The first sentence, 'John may be early,' posits a situation type: it says that, 
in some possible situation, John is early to his appointment: 
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D1   s: s |= << John is early >> 
 
That -structure itself is interpreted with respect to a situation s1, a 
situation which supports the fact that John may be early. That (exercised) 
situation is different from the possible situation in which John is early 
(mentioned situation). The complete content of D1 therefore is: 
 
C(D1) [s1] |= <<  s: s |= <<John is early>> >> 
 
 The second sentence, D2, says something of the situation type 
posited by the first sentence: that it supports <<John will wait>>: 
 
D2  TJohn is early |= << John will wait >> 
 
That -structure also must be interpreted with respect to a situation. 
Simplifying somewhat, I will take that situation to be the same as 
previously, viz. s1. The complete content of the second sentence therefore 
is: 
 
C(D2) [s1] |= << TJohn is early |= << John will wait >> >> 
 
At this point projection operates, and the situation type TJohn is early is 
assumed. The third sentence, which describes what John will do, is 
interpreted with respect to that situation type: 
 
C(D3)  [TJohn is early] |= << John will read the newspaper 
      or think about his next book >>  
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Sentence (4) also is interpreted with respect to that situation: 
 
C(D4)  [TJohn is early] |= << There won't be any problem >> 
 
 Most philosophers, confronted with the little text above, would 
consider sentences D3 and D4 as elliptic for some conditional sentence: 'If 
John is early he will read the newpaper or will think about his next book', 
and 'If John is early there won't be any problem' respectively. That is 
because they have the feeling that what is asserted is 'about' the possible 
situation in which John is early. But there are different ways of being about 
a situation. In a conditional sentence such as 'If John is early, he will wait', 
the situation in which John is early is explicitly mentioned; but in (3) and 
(4) the situation in which John is early is assumed. The representation 
'concerns' that situation, but it is not 'about' it (Perry 1986b). I shall return 
to that contrast in §6. 
 
4.3 Projection from factual -structures 
Factual -structures too allow projection. (E) below is very similar to (D): 
 
(E) In Chicago the temperature is currently minus 40. (E1) 
 Schoolchildren stay at home. (E2) 
 
Here too I would say that the second sentence is not elliptical for 'In 
Chicago schoolchildren stay at home', even though it is clearly interpreted 
with respect to the Chicago situation. The complete content of the first 
sentence is: 
 
C(E1) [s2] |= << Chicago |= << the temperature is minus 40 >> >> 
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Projection operates from that situated -structure: the Chicago situation is 
assumed, and the second sentence is interpreted with respect to that 
situation: 
 
C(E2)  [Chicago] |= << schoolchildren stay at home >> 
 
 The contrast between C(E1) and C(E2), that is, between mentioning 
the Chicago situation and assuming that situation, is similar to the contrast, 
mentioned earlier, between 
 
  [Paris] |=  << it is raining>> 
and 
  [France] |= << Paris |= << it is raining >> >> 
 
But there is a significant difference between the Chicago example and the 
Paris example. In the latter example the exercised situation — Paris — is 
provided by the extralinguistic context; in E2 the exercised situation — 
Chicago — is a situation which has been mentioned and becomes the 
exercised situation through projection. That distinction too will be 
discussed in §6. 
 
4.4 Projection from simple representations 
Projection from a -structure is a particular case of situational assumption: 
it is the case in which we assume a situation mentioned in some -structure. 
But any mentioned situation can be assumed, even if it's not mentioned in a 
-structure. In the following examples the 'base' of the projection (the 
representation from which projection operates) is not a -structure: 
 
(1) John is totally paranoid. Everybody spies him or wants to kill him, 
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 including his own mother. 
 
(2) I did not know you were so much interested in knights. You should 
 read A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court, by 
 Mark Twain. There are a lot of knights. 
 
(3) Berkeley is a nice place. There are bookstores and 
 coffee shops everywhere. 
 
 In those examples the base of the projection (i.e. the underlined 
sentence) is not a -structure; it is a 'simple' representation with the form 
Rn (a1, ..., an), e.g. 'Berkeley is a nice place', or 'John is paranoid', or 'You 
should read Connecticut Yankee'. Yet projection operates: the exercised 
situation shifts from a broader situation s' including the situation s 
considered as object, to the situation s itself. 
 In (1) the (exercised) situation we start with is a real situation s' 
which contains John and his mental states. That situation s' is said in the 
first sentence to support <<John is paranoid>>. Now a paranoid is someone 
who believes himself to be in a certain type of situation. Let us call the 
situation John believes himself to be in his 'belief-world', Beljohn. The 
second sentence of (1) is interpreted directly with respect to that belief 
world, which is assumed. The speaker does not seriously assert that 
everybody spies John or wants to kill him: she expects the hearer to 
understand that fact as holding in John belief-world. Such a shift in point 
of view is constitutive of 'free indirect speech', of which (1) is a typical 
instance. 
 In (2) Twain's fiction (a portion of the actual world) is mentioned in 
the first sentence. Now Twain's fiction has a certain content, that is, it 
describes a certain situation. The second sentence of (2) is directly 
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interpreted with respect to that counterfactual situation. It is in that 
situation that there are a lot of knights. Similarly, in (3), the situation 
mentioned in the first sentence is Berkeley, and the second sentence is 
interpreted with respect to that situation: 'everywhere' ranges over locations 
in Berkeley. 
 The difference between (1)-(2) and (3) will be dealt with in §5. What 
is common to those examples is that they all involve projection: the 
situation mentioned in the first sentence is 'exercised' and used as context 
for the interpretation of the second sentence. Examples (1) to (3) can be 
analysed as follows: 
 
C(1) 
 [s' ] |= << John is paranoid >> 
  [Beljohn] |= << John's mother wants to kill him >> 
 
C(2) 
 [s' ] |= << You should read Connecticut Yankee >> 
  [w(Connecticut Yankee)] |= <<There are a lot of knights >>11 
 
C(3) 
 [USA] |= << Berkeley is a nice place >> 
  [Berkeley] |= << There are coffee shops everywhere >> 
 
§5. Projection from meta-representations 
 
5.1 Projection, meta-representations, and  the dual structure  of 
situations 
                                           
11 On the meaning of 'w ' see below, §5.1. 
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In examples (1) and (2) from the previous subsection (repeated below), the 
base of the projection is a meta-representation. 
 
(1) John is totally paranoid. Everybody spies him or wants to kill him, 
 including his own mother. 
 
(2) I did not know you were so much interested in knights. You should 
 read A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's court, by 
 Mark Twain. There are a lot of knights. 
 
In (2) the base refers to a certain book, and in (1) it (indirectly) refers to 
John's mental states. Both the book and the mental states are 
'representations' which have a certain content, i.e. which describe a certain 
situation. In meta-representational projection the base refers to a 
representation, and the situation which is projectively assumed is the 
situation which the mentioned representation describes. I refer to that 
situation as w(r): the world of the representation. Depending on the sort of 
representation r is, w(r) will be the world of a picture, of a novel, of an 
utterance, or the belief world of some particular person. 
 Meta-representations are known to involve a double layer of content. 
They are about some object-representation, but the object-representation 
itself is about something, hence two levels are involved and projection 
becomes possible. Examples like (3), however, show that that dual 
structure is an instance of a more general phenomenon. 
 
(3) Berkeley is a nice place. There are bookstores and 
 coffee shops everywhere. 
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Berkeley is not a representation, and the first sentence of (3) is not a meta-
representation. Yet we find the dual structure which makes projection 
possible. The first sentence of (3) talks directly about Berkeley considered 
as an object: it states a fact of which Berkeley is a constituent. But the 
second sentence of (3) does not talk about Berkeley in this manner. The 
second sentence of (3) expresses a fact internal to Berkeley rather than a 
fact 'about' Berkeley in the sense of including Berkeley as a constituent. 
The second sentence of (3) is interpreted with respect to the Berkeley 
situation without mentioning that situation. That is possible because the 
Berkeley situation has already been mentioned — in the first sentence. This 
is a standard instance of projection. 
 'Situations' are entities with a dual character. They are objects which 
enter into relations and can be thought and talked about; but at the same 
time they have a 'content', which is a sort of micro-world, containing the 
facts internal to the situation. When we mention a situation, we evoke its 
content and this is sufficient to make projection possible: mentioning a 
situation makes its content available as a 'context' for the interpretation of 
other representations which do not mention that situation. (See Sperber and 
Wilson 1986 for the relevant notions of 'context' and 'interpretation'.) It 
follows that projection is possible whenever a situation with a certain 
content is mentioned; what is mentioned need not be a representation. 
 
5.2 Situational content vs representational content 
That is not to deny that there are clear differences between meta-
representational cases like (1)-(2), on the one hand, and non-meta-
representational cases like (3) on the other hand. The meta-representational 
examples, especially (1), clearly involve something like mental projection. 
Few students of 'free indirect speech' would deny this. The same intuition 
is commonly appealed to by theorists of fiction, who maintain that mental 
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projection is involved in examples like (2). Note that the intuition is 
weaker in the second case than it is in the first case; that may be because 
the projection is very routinely accomplished in our conventional way of 
talking about fiction. Be that as it may, when we turn to example like (3), it 
becomes highly controversial that mental projection is involved (as I 
claim): we do not have strong intuitions to that effect, as we do in the case 
of (1). 
 I think the intuitive difference between (1)-(2) and (3) points to an 
important difference between representations and other entities. Let us 
compare Berkeley and Twain's book. Being a representation, Twain's book 
has something which Berkeley hasn't, namely, a representational content. I 
said that Berkeley, qua situation, has a content, namely the set of facts 
internal to the situation; but that situational content is not the same sort of 
thing as the content of Twain's book. The situational content of s is the set 
of facts internal to s. The distinction between situational content and 
representational content is important because representations themselves 
are 'situations'. Qua situations, they have a dual character: they are objects 
which enter into relations, and they have a situational content. In the same 
way in which Berkeley has a situational content, namely the set of facts 
which hold in Berkeley, Twain's book has a situational content, consisting 
of 'internal' facts such as the fact that there are fourty five chapters (the first 
one of which is not counted as a chapter), or the fact that a particular 
passage is borrowed, language and all, from the Morte d'Arthur. What is 
distinctive of Twain's book, qua representation, is that it has a 
representational content over and beyond its situational content. The 
representational content of Twain's book contains e.g. the fact that a person 
called Hank Morgan, cracked on the head by a crowbar in nineteenth-
century Connecticut, wakes to find himself in King Arthur's England. 
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 Because representations have a representational content over and 
above the situational content which every situation has, they allow for a 
special type of projection which I call 'intensional projection'. Let us first 
characterize the other type of projection: extensional projection. In 
extensional projection, a situation s is mentioned, and thereafter assumed: 
during the first stage, the situation s is considered as an object and talked 
about from the perspective of a broader, exercised situation s', while the 
second stage sees s itself playing the role of the exercised situation. In 
intensional projection, something similar but more complex happens. A 
situation s is also mentioned during the first stage, but that situation s is a 
representation and, qua representation, it describes a situation w(s). Now it 
is the described situation w(s) which is assumed during the second stage, in 
intensional projection. So we have the following contrast: 
 
Extensional projection 
[s' ] |= <<...s...>> 
 [s ] |= ... 
 
Intensional projection: 
[s' ] |= <<...s...>> 
 [w(s) ] |= ... 
 
The difference is illustrated by: 
 
(4) I've just read Twain's book. There are a lot of chapters. 
vs. 
(5) I've just read Twain's book. There are a lot of knights. 
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In both cases projection operates: the second sentence is interpreted with 
respect to an exercised situation distinct from the exercised situation which 
governs the interpretation of the first sentence. In (4) the exercised 
situation for the second sentence is the situation mentioned in the first 
sentence (Twain's book). In (5) the exercised situation for the second 
sentence is w(Twain's book): the story told in the book. 
 Whenever it is a representation which is mentioned in the base, the 
two types of projection can take place; while only extensional projection is 
possible when the mentioned situation is not a representation. For an 
illustration of the contextual ambiguity thus generated, consider this piece 
of discourse: 
 
 I've just read Twain's book. There are a lot of pages. 
 
'Page' can mean either one side of the leaf of a book, or a young male 
attendant on kings, nobles etc. In the context of 'I've just read Twain's 
book', both readings make sense. In the 'leaf' reading the second sentence 
states a fact concerning Twain's book (extensional projection); in the 
'young male' reading it states a fact concerning the story told by Twain's 
book (intensional projection). 
 The difference between extensional and intensional projection 
accounts for the difference in our intuitions concerning (1)-(2) and (3) 
above; it accounts for the fact that, in the Berkeley example, the projection 
is barely noticed, while in the 'paranoid' example the shift of point of view 
is very manifest. Extensional projection is like zooming: a detail s from 
some original scene (= exercised situation) s' is focussed on in such a way 
that it becomes the scene (the exercised situation). The difference between 
the first stage (when s is seen against the background of other things in s' ) 
and the second stage (when s itself is the background against which things 
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in s are seen) is a difference of grain. In intensional projection, however, s 
is not a portion of s' which has been focussed on, but an alternative 
universe. The shift is much more dramatic and noticeable. 
 The intuitive difference between the two types of case should not be 
overestimated, however. As I already mentioned, example (2) is 
intermediate between (1) and (3) as far as the strength of our intuitions is 
concerned. And examples of intensional projection in which the projective 
step is hardly noticed are not difficult to find. What follows is an example 
taken almost at random. 
 
5.3 An example of intensional projection 
Open the first encyclopedia of philosophy that comes to hand. In a typical 
entry from such an encyclopedia, you will find sentences explicitly about 
the philosopher's life and views (e.g. sentences beginning with 'According 
to Leibniz...'), followed by sentences directly presenting those views. The 
following passage from Urmson's Concise Encyclopedia provides an 
example: 
 
Leibniz's [metaphysics] is completed by his proofs of the existence of 
God. The system of created monads is, in a sense, complete in itself, that 
is, it is necessarily as it is granted that any part of it exists. But no one 
part of it contains the reason for its own existence, so that the reason for 
its existence must lie in a being which does contain its own reason for 
existence, that is, in a necessary being, which we call God. This 
argument, the 'cosmological argument', appears in the Monadology and 
there is nothing in it which is peculiar to Leibniz.    
    [Urmson, ed., 1975: 156] 
 
There is a clear contrast between the first and last sentence of that passage 
on the one hand, and the intermediate sentences on the other. The 
intermediate sentences state Leibniz's own view of the matter: it is Leibniz 
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himself who speaks, as it were. The first and last sentence refer to Leibniz 
and his view, and express the beliefs of the author of the article, rather than 
Leibniz's beliefs. 
 In the situational framework, the passage can be described as 
follows. The author of the article talks about one particular aspect of the 
history of Western philosophy and philosophers, viz. Leibniz and his 
metaphysical system. That is the exercised situation for the first and last 
sentences of our passage: the author of the article states two facts 
concerning that portion of Western philosophy, namely the fact that 
Leibniz's doctrine of monads is completed by his proofs of the existence of 
God (first sentence), and the fact that the Cosmological argument can be 
found in the Monadology and is not peculiar to Leibniz (last sentence). In 
contrast, the exercised situation for the intermediate sentences is not the 
portion of the world which includes Leibniz and his works, but a 
counterfactual situation, viz. the situation which Leibniz's metaphysical 
writings describe: the 'Leibnizian universe', as we may call it. That is a very 
different situation from the portion of the actual world which the author of 
the encyclopedia article talks about. The Leibnizian universe includes God, 
monads, etc; the portion of @ which the author of the article talks about 
includes Leibniz, Arnauld, and the Royal Library at Hanover. 
 The intermediate sentences are meant as (direct) descriptions of the 
Leibnizian universe; they are not an elliptical description of Leibniz 
describing the Leibnizian universe. In other words, projection operates. But 
projection is such a pervasive mechanism that it is barely noticed even 
though, in this particular case, it belongs to the more dramatic, intensional 
variety. 
 
§6. Situations and cognitive content 
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6.1 Projection vs. ellipsis 
Let us go back to the Berkeley example: 
 
Berkeley is a nice place. There are bookstores and coffee shops 
everywhere. 
 
Most language theorists would say that 'There are bookstores and coffee 
shops everywhere' is elliptical for 'In Berkeley, there are bookstores and 
coffee shops everywhere'. In what sense is my claim about projection 
different from the traditional ellipsis claim? What is the difference between 
saying that the sentence is elliptical for 'In Berkeley there are bookstores 
and coffee shops everywhere' and saying that the Berkeley situation is 
contextually assumed? 
 I agree that Berkeley is an aspect of the content of 'There are 
bookstores and coffee shops everywhere', in the following sense. The 
speaker (or the thinker) has Berkeley in mind when she says 'There are 
bookstores and coffee shops everywhere'. She is talking of Berkeley, not of 
Paris or any other city. In Perry's terminology, Berkeley is an 'unarticulated 
constituent' of the content expressed by the second sentence. Still, there are 
different ways of construing this notion of an unarticulated constituent. To 
say that 'There are bookstores and coffee shops everywhere' is elliptical for 
'In Berkeley there are bookstores and coffee shops everywhere' is to opt for 
a particular construal, one which I think must be rejected. 
 In the Austinian framework the complete content of a representation 
is two-fold: it consists of the fact which the representation expresses, plus 
the situation which that fact concerns. The structure of the complete 
content is: 
 
 [s ] |= p 
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Since the complete content of an utterance or thought is an Austinian 
proposition with two components, there are two options for unarticulated 
constituents: they can belong either to the situational component, or to the 
'radical' (i.e. the right-hand side of the Austinian proposition). 
 According to my theory of projection, the situation mentioned by the 
base determines the 'exercised situation' with respect to which the 
representation that follows is projectively interpreted. The complete 
content of 'There are bookstores and coffee shops everywhere' therefore is: 
 
 [Berkeley] |= <<There are bookstores and coffee shops   
   everywhere>> 
 
In other words, the fact which is stated (on the right-hand side) does not 
include Berkeley as a constituent; in that respect it is very different from 
the fact stated by the base, namely, the fact that Berkeley is a nice place. 
For that fact is about Berkeley in the strong sense: it includes it as a 
constituent. The complete content of the base is: 
 
 [The US situation] |= << Berkeley is a nice place >> 
 
Here we find Berkeley on the side of the radical, rather than on the 
situational side. 
 In this theory there is a semantic difference between 'There are 
bookstores and coffee shops everywhere', which states a fact concerning 
Berkeley, and 'In Berkeley there are bookstores and coffee shops 
everywhere', which states a different fact (a fact about Berkeley), 
concerning a wider portion of the universe. That semantic difference is the 
reason why I reject the notion that one utterance is merely 'elliptical' for the 
other (hence synonymous with it). 
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6.2 'Concerning' and being 'about' 
The difference between 'concerning' and 'being about' has been elaborated 
by Perry in his paper 'Thought without representation' (Perry 1986b). That 
difference comes out most clearly in the case of the Z-landers, a group of 
people who 'do not travel to, or communicate with residents of, other 
places' and have no name for the place they live in. 
 
When a Z-lander sees rain, he will say to others not in a position to look 
outdoors, It is raining. His listeners then act appropriately to there being 
rain in Z-land: they close the windows in Z-land, cancel plans for Z-land 
picnics, and grab umbrellas before going into the Z-land out-of-doors. 
They have no other use for 'It is raining'. They do not call their sons in 
far-off places, or listen to the weather news, or read newspapers with 
national weather reports. [Perry 1986b : 212] 
 
As Perry points out, Z-land is an unarticulated constituent of the content 
expressed by the Z-lander's utterance 'It's raining'. The utterance is true if 
and only if it is raining in Z-land. But the Z-landers do not have a concept 
or idea of Z-land as opposed to other places. Their weather thoughts 
'concern' Z-land, not by virtue of containing a representation of Z-land (in 
which case they would be 'about' Z-land), but by virtue of their being in Z-
land. In other words, the unarticulated constituent is unarticulated not only 
linguistically but also mentally: it's a constituent of content directly 
provided by the environment. 
 In such cases the mental representation, considered in abstraction 
from the environment which it concerns, expresses less than a complete 
proposition. The Z-landers think 'It is raining': the content thus articulated 
is not fully propositional — it is a propositional function, which is truth-
evaluable only with respect to a particular place. Let us call that articulated 
content the 'cognitive' or 'narrow' content of the representation. It is only 
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when the environment is taken into account that a complete, 'broad' content 
is expressed, which includes Z-land as an unarticulated constituent. In the 
Austinian framework, the distinction between the ('narrow') mental 
component and the environmental component corresponds to the 
distinction between the exercised situation and the radical. The complete 
content of the Z-lander's thought or utterance is: 
 
 [Z-land] |= << It's raining >> 
 
 Now, as Perry pleasantly says, 'there is a little of the Z-lander in the 
most well-traveled of us' (Perry 1986b : 216). The difference between the 
Z-landers and us is that we do have a notion of the place where we live, as 
opposed to other places; so we are capable of entertaining a thought about 
the place where we are, such as 'It's raining in Paris, but not in Saint 
Tropez'. Perry's point, however, is that when we're in Paris (or Palo Alto) 
and we say or think 'it's raining', we need not think reflectively about the 
place we're in. We can think 'It's raining' and let the place we are in 
complete the content of our thought. In such a case the complete content of 
our thought is: 
 
 [Paris] |= << It's raining >> 
 
rather than 
 
 [s' ] |= << Paris |= << It's raining >> >> 
 
Our thought 'concerns' Paris, but it is not about Paris in the sense of 
including a specific representation of Paris. 
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6.3 The cognitive argument 
The major reason for putting the unarticulated constituent on the situational 
side rather than the side of the radical is that this enables us to capture 
cognitive generalizations such as: when someone thinks <<It's raining>> 
she takes her umbrella if she wants to go outdoors, she cancels plans for 
picnics, and so forth. There is a sense in which the person who thinks 'It's 
raining' in Palo Alto, and the person who thinks that in Paris, think similar 
thoughts, resulting from similar perceptions, and behave similarly. To 
account for that similarity we must posit some element of content common 
to the two thoughts — something which does not vary when the concerned 
situation varies (Perry 1986b). In the Austinian framework, the radical <<It 
is raining>> is that common element of content. In a speech or thought 
episode, that radical is 'applied' to the situation which the utterance (or 
thought) concerns. 
 Barwise (1989) also appeals to the cognitive argument, in connection 
with the following example. Suppose Holmes and Watson face each other. 
In between stand the salt and the pepper. Holmes says 'The salt is left of the 
pepper', because the salt is left of the pepper from Holmes's perspective. 
From Watson's perspective, the pepper is left of the salt; however, Watson 
is mistaken as to which shaker is which, and he wrongly says 'The salt is 
left of the pepper'. Holmes and Watson apparently 'say the same thing', but 
Holmes is right and Watson wrong. This familiar situation shows that the 
complete content of what they say or think cannot be merely: 'The salt is 
left of the pepper'. Some unarticulated constituent must be involved, which 
accounts for the difference in truth-value. This unarticulated constituent is 
the perspective: the salt is on the left from Holmes's perspective, but it is 
not on the left from Watson's perspective. That is why Holmes is right and 
Watson wrong. This said, there are two ways to go, according to Barwise: 
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the unarticulated constituent may be fed into the radical, or into the 
situation talked about. 
 On the first option, both Watson and Holmes are talking about the 
same 'objective' situation (the situation they share), but they state different 
facts about that situation. The facts they state are, respectively: 
 
Holmes: 
Left-of (salt, pepper, perspective H) 
Watson: 
Left-of (salt, pepper, perspective W) 
 
Watson's and Holmes's perspectives turn out to be (unarticulated) 
constituents of the facts which they state. 
 On the second option, the radical is invariant: Holmes and Watson 
state the same fact: 
 
 Left of (salt, pepper) 
 
However, Holmes and Watson talk about different situations. The 
situations are individuated in terms of Holmes's and Watson's subjective 
perspectives on them.12 The complete content of Watson's and Holmes's 
respective utterances are: 
                                           
12 The second option could be objected to on the following grounds. Whatever is talked 
about has to be 'objective' to some degree, and 'perspectival situations' do not have the 
right degree of objectivity: the perspective seems to be much more an aspect of the 
'mode of presentation' under which the situation is thought about, than an aspect of the 
situation itself. That objection is serious but I think it can be met. Nothing prevents us 
from viewing perspectival situations as 'reflexive situations' which include a viewer 
with a perspective on the situation. Holmes's situation is a reflexive situation including 
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Holmes: 
[Holmes's perspective] |= <<The salt is left of the pepper>> 
 
Watson: 
[Watson's perspective] |= <<The salt is left of the pepper>> 
 
 The second option enables us to say that the radical is the same for 
Watson and Holmes, thereby capturing their similarity of attitudes. If we 
take the first option, then, according to Barwise (1989: 240), 'we have 
nothing in the theory that classifies the similarity in attitudes of Holmes 
and Watson in cases like these. And it is this similarity that leads them to 
make the same bodily movements, reaching in the same direction, though 
toward different objects, when they want the salt.'  
 
6.4 'Deictic' and 'anaphoric' cases 
The similarity between Perry's and Barwise's examples and my examples 
of projection is striking when we consider how they are analysed in the 
Austinian framework: 
 
[Palo Alto] |=  <<It's raining>> 
 
[Holmes's perspective] |= <<The pepper is left of the salt>> 
 
[Berkeley] |= <<There are bookstores and 
   coffee shops everywhere>> 
                                                                                                                           
him as viewer, while Watson's situation is identical except that he is the viewer. Those 
reflexive situations are 'objective' because Holmes and Watson are both objectively 
viewers; their having a perspective on the situation they participate in is as much an 
objective fact as anything else. Holmes and Watson merely focus on their own 
perspectives, i.e. on a portion of the situation they are both in. 
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However, there is also a striking difference between the first two examples 
and the third one — a difference which it is time to consider and account 
for. 
 Succintly put, the difference is this. In the Barwise-Perry examples 
the exercised situation is determined by the external context: the place 
where the Z-landers live, the place where Perry's son is, Holmes's 
perspective, etc. In the projection examples the exercised situation is 
determined projectively from the preceding discourse. 
 The distinction I have just made is similar to, and no more 
mysterious than, the difference between anaphoric and demonstrative 
readings of the pronoun 'he'. The contextual values of the pronoun can be 
determined directly by the situation of discourse, or indirectly from the 
discourse itself. In the same way (though on the 'unarticulated' mode), the 
exercised situation, determined by the context, can be determined directly 
by the situation of discourse ('deictic' cases) or indirectly from the 
discourse itself ('anaphoric' cases). 
 In 'deictic' cases, the agent is in the relevant situation, hence she can 
entertain the contents appropriate to that situation (e.g. 'It's raining') 
without having to entertain the reflective content 'about' the situation (e.g. 
'It's raining in Paris'). In 'anaphoric' cases the relevant situation (e.g. 
Berkeley) is available indirectly, through projection from some 
representation about that situation ('Berkeley is a nice place'). 
 The cognitive argument which Perry and Barwise both appeal to in 
support of the Austinian analysis is suited to 'deictic' cases: when a 
cognitive agent finds herself in a situation s and thinks 'It's raining', she 
tends to behave in a certain way: she takes her umbrella, etc. The agent's 
behavioural dispositions reflect the radical which she entertains, 
independently of the particular situation which the thought concerns. Can 
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we extend this argument to 'anaphoric' cases? It seems that we cannot. For 
the cognitive agent who thinks: 'In Chicago the weather is bad. It's raining. 
Bobby thinks of going to Florida for a change' is not thereby disposed to 
take her umbrella when going outdoors. The situation which she assumes 
(the Chicago situation) is distinct from the situation she is in, and her 
dispositions to act concern the latter, not the former. 
 In projection, however, the subject's mental behaviour reflects the 
radical she entertains. The agent who projectively entertains the 
representation 'It is raining' is thereby disposed to inferentially exploit that 
representation in spontaneous reasoning. For example she will infer that 
the pavements are wet, etc. The subject does not believe that it is raining, 
but, as long as she assumes the Chicago situation, she 'accepts' the 
representation that it is raining and feed it to the inferential device, as if it 
was a genuine belief. (Normally, only representations in the belief box are 
freely exploited in spontaneous inference.) In other words, she engages in 
'mental simulation'.13 In mental simulation the path to action is blocked but 
otherwise the subject is in qualitatively the same cognitive state she would 
be in if the representation she accepts concerned her actual situation 
(Currie 1995). If, as I claim, projection in general (and not merely 
intensional projection) is an instance of mental simulation, the cognitive 
argument can be appealed to with respect to 'anaphoric' cases as well as to 
'deictic' cases. 
 
§7. Conclusion 
 
                                           
13 On mental simulation, see Kahneman and Tversky (1982) and the huge literature on 
simulation in psychological explanation (see Davies and Stone, eds, forthcoming). For 
more on belief, acceptance and simulation, see Recanati, forthcoming b, part 2. 
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My starting point in this paper was the transition from 'It's raining' to 'It's 
raining in Paris': 
 
It's raining 
This is Paris 
Ergo: It's raining in Paris 
 
That transition (an instance of 'basic vertical interpreting') I call 'reflection'; 
it involves going from a representation concerning a situation s, to a 
representation explicitly about s. 
 I have shown that reflection entails a shift in the exercised situation, 
hence a change of context (since the exercised situation is an aspect of the 
context with respect to which the representation is interpreted). This is in 
contrast to the standard view, according to which vertical interpreting in 
general is de-coupled from contextual change. 
 The context is not the only thing that changes in the reflective 
process; the content of the representation also changes, contrary to what the 
standard view leads us to expect. For example we go from (1) to (2): 
 
(1) [Paris] |= <<It's raining>> 
(2) [Europe] |= <<Paris |= <<It's raining>>>> 
 
Both the complete content (the global Austinian proposition) and the 
radical (the right hand side of the Austinian proposition) differ in (1) and 
(2). But the transition still counts as content preserving in some crucial 
respect. What is retained is the claim that a certain situation (the Paris 
situation) supports a certain fact (the fact that it is raining). The difference 
between the premiss and the conclusion is that the situation in question is 
exercised in the premiss, mentioned in the conclusion. The Austinian 
framework permits us to capture that common component of content. 
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 A large portion of this paper has been devoted to an instance of basic 
vertical interpreting distinct from reflection: projection. Projection is very 
similar to reflection, but inversely oriented. Projection and reflection both 
involve two representations: one which concerns a situation s, and another 
one which is about that situation. Through reflection we go from the 
representation concerning s to the representation about s. Through 
projection we go from the representation about s to the representation 
concerning s. I believe that projection, in both speech and thought, is an 
important phenomenon, and I hope that my efforts (following those of 
Fauconnier 1985)14 will encourage others to investigate it further. I also 
believe that Austinian semantics provides an adequate framework for 
studying that phenomenon. 
                                           
14 Fauconnier's pioneering theory of 'mental spaces' uses a notion like that of a -
structure, and it unifies extensional and intensional projection. I am much indebted to 
that work. 
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